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Jocham et al. demonstrate that learning is
driven by several mechanisms operating
in parallel, of which only one relies on
knowing the relationship between
outcomes and choices that cause them.
This contingent learning is mediated by
activity in orbitofrontal cortex.
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When an organism receives a reward, it is crucial to
know which of many candidate actions caused this
reward. However, recent work suggests that learning
is possible even when this most fundamental
assumption is not met. We used novel reward-
guided learning paradigms in two fMRI studies to
show that humans deploy separable learning mech-
anisms that operate in parallel. While behavior was
dominated by precise contingent learning, it also re-
vealed hallmarks of noncontingent learning strate-
gies. These learning mechanisms were separable
behaviorally and neurally. Lateral orbitofrontal cortex
supported contingent learning and reflected contin-
gencies between outcomes and their causal choices.
Amygdala responses around reward times related to
statistical patterns of learning. Time-based heuristic
mechanisms were related to activity in sensorimotor
corticostriatal circuitry. Our data point to the exis-
tence of several learning mechanisms in the human
brain, of which only one relies on applying known
rules about the causal structure of the task.
INTRODUCTION
An organism’s ability to learn from behavioral outcomes is cen-
tral to its evolutionary success. Recent decades have seen
important advances in our understanding of the computations
underlying many flavors of such reinforcement learning, but
these models begin with a fundamental assumption, that organ-
isms can attribute each outcome to the behavior that caused it,
that is, they can assign the credit for an outcome correctly. Re-
sults of recent lesions studies have challenged this assumption,suggesting that learning is possible even when this simplest
assumption is not met, and that these noncontingent mecha-
nisms dominate behavior when lesions are made to the lateral
orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC; Walton et al., 2010).
On initial consideration, several features of these results are
surprising. When learning from rewards, the brain faces many
complex computational problems. However, since typical
neuroscience experiments separate behavior into discrete trials,
there is no ambiguity about action-reward pairings and hence no
apparent computational problem to solve. It appears paradoxi-
cal, then, that a brain region as evolutionarily recent as lOFC is
required for this apparently trivial attribution. It is perhaps equally
surprising, however, that any learning is possible in its absence.
If an agent does not knowwhich action led to which reward, how
can it learn which actions are good at all?
Insights into these seeming conundrums can perhaps be
gleaned by considering real-world ecological problems that exist
outside the laboratory. In the real world, agents take many ac-
tions, and only some of them have consequences. These conse-
quences may be delayed in time with many intervening irrelevant
actions. Furthermore, many important outcomes are not even
consequences of the agent’s behavior. It becomes a difficult
and important problem to discern which outcomes should cause
learning, and on which actions (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In rein-
forcement learning terms, it becomes important to apply the cor-
rect state space during learning (Wilson et al., 2014).
One can think of different classes of mechanism for solving
this problem. In precise contingent mechanisms, agents may
be able to attribute particular outcomes to their causal actions
due to external knowledge—if a cake is burned, it is more likely
to be caused by the cooking time than the quantity of sugar in
the recipe. Similarly, if experimental animals have extensive prior
experience of outcomes following actions in a trial structure, they
may learn to solve the attribution problem precisely even with a
new set of experimental stimuli or type of reward.
In the absence of such external knowledge, it may still be
possible to attribute outcomes to actions precisely by usingNeuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authors 177
Figure 1. Task Schematic
Task schematic for experiment 1 (left) and experiment 2 (right).heuristic mechanisms that capitalize on common features of
causal relationships. For example, outcomes may be attributed
toactions that immediatelypreceded them—abuttonpress imme-
diately followed by a loud explosion is unlikely to be repeated, but
evena fewsecondsdelaymayprevent any suchassociation being
made.Here, agentscanuseaheuristic rule that isoften true in real-
world learning and has therefore been favored by evolution.
Even when attributions cannot be made precisely, they may
still be made through statistical mechanisms. If one action has
been taken more often than another, or has been pursued for a
longer recent period of time, then it is more likely to be the cause
of outcomes. Such considerations may lead to learning strate-
gies familiar in ecological theories of behavior (Charnov, 1976)
that state that if the time-average reward is high, then agents
should continue with current behavioral policies.
Here, we show that in complex environments, healthy hu-
mans’ behavior is guided bymultiple learning mechanisms oper-
ating in parallel. While behavior was dominated by learning on
the basis of precise contingent associations between outcomes
and their causal choices, behavior also displayed hallmarks of
simpler learning mechanisms that do not rely on such contingent
associations. We found signals pertaining to the different
learning mechanisms in separable brain circuits. Precise contin-
gent learning was supported by a system centered on lOFC.
Amygdala activity, or the absence of amygdala suppression,
was related principally to statistical learning mechanisms. Prox-
imal heuristic mechanisms were related to circuitry in motor re-
gions of the cortico-striatal circuitry.
RESULTS
Weperformedtwoexperiments toprobedifferentmechanisms for
credit assignment in the intact human brain using fMRI (Figure 1).
Experiment 1 was designed to reveal signatures of each learning
mechanism in normal behavior and harness fluctuations across178 Neuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authorsthe population to investigate their neural bases. Experiment 2
introduced manipulations that interfered with contingencies, al-
lowing us to search for brain signals aligned with contingency,
rather than reward or behavior. In both experiments, participants
chose between different stimuli with independent probabilities to
give rewards. These probabilities changed over time. Thus, sub-
jects needed to continuously learn the stimulus-reward associa-
tions. To ensure that participants chose only the stimuli that
were likely to give a reward, each choice incurred a cost.
In experiment 1, we aimed to simulate an ecologically realistic
situation where many possible choices could be credited for a
reward and only some rewards were caused by participant’s
behavior. We reasoned that credit assignment by precise
contingent learning would be heavily taxed in such an environ-
ment, allowing the contribution of other mechanisms to become
evident. A total of 23 participants (12 female) were presented
with a continuous random succession of geometrical shapes
(A / B / C). Shapes were moving across the screen from left
to right, one at a time, during a period of 1.5 s (Figure 1, left).
While on screen, these options could either be selected by
pressing a specific button (incurring a small cost) or ignored.
Critically, for a rewarded choice, participants received a contin-
gent reward 3 s after the choice that caused it (subjects were
informed and extensively pretrained on this delay). Thus, among
the many choices participants made, they had to assign credit
only to the specific choices made 3 s prior to reward delivery.
However, in addition, subjects also received noncontingent
rewards in a random fashion, independent of their behavior.
Crucially, these two types of rewards were distinguishable (by
color, red or blue, counterbalanced across subjects), and sub-
jects were instructed to focus on contingent rewards and to
ignore the noncontingent rewards. Thus, because subjects
have to link contingent rewards to the choice made 3 s before
rather than to the option currently observed, this design breaks
the common ‘‘trial-like’’ structure for reward-guided learning
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A–C) Logistic regression results of experiment 1. Figures show how choices (0/1) of the option on the current trial are influenced by past rewards following
choices of same option A (A); different options B or C (B); and again different options B or C, but depending on how often same option A had been chosen in the
past 30 trials (C), depending on when the reward occurred relative to choice (bin 1, 0–0.5 s; 2, 0.5–1.5 s; 3, 1.5–2.5 s; 4, 2.5–3.5 s; 5, 3.5–4.5 s before reward).
Values are mean ± SEM (across participants) of the regression coefficients obtained from the logistic regression.
(D) A separate linear regression shows that the average rate of responding in experiment 1 is, by definition, related to the rate of contingent rewards (CRs) but also
to the rate of noncontingent rewards (NCRs), despite them being unrelated to behavior.
(E and F) Behavioral results of experiment 2. Using multiple logistic regression, we tested whether our instructions reliably induced contingent and noncontingent
learning.
(E) Each box represents one condition, and each cell within a box represents a particular regressor. High parameter estimates are shown in white; low estimates in
black. These regressors can be arranged into the lower quadrant of a square where the lead diagonal represents DIRECT learning (red), the next lower diagonal
represents 1BACK learning (green), and the third diagonal 2BACK learning (yellow). For example, the first regressor in the top left box should receive loading if
decisions under DIRECT instructions can be explained by a model in which any reward obtained on the previous trial (n – 1 column) is associated with the choice
on that trial (n – 1 row). The plot shows that the DIRECT, 1BACK, and 2BACK conditions have predominantly yielded high parameter estimates in their respective
red, green, and yellow regressors, while the FORWARD condition has led to loadings that are distributed across the different association types, as hypothesized.
(F) Averaging across the corresponding associations (red, green, and yellow diagonals, respectively) shows that the three different associations load differently
depending on the instructed condition. See also Figures S1–S4.
All error bars represent SEM.tasks. This design allowed us to quantify interindividual differ-
ences in learning from contingent and noncontingent rewards.
The rate of noncontingent reward delivery was established dur-
ing piloting to match that of contingent rewards across subjects.
Behavior Is Guided by Separable Contingent and
Noncontingent Learning Mechanisms
To separate contingent from noncontingent learning in experi-
ment 1, we used a multiple logistic regression to test how re-
wards following the choice of an option influenced the probability
of choosing this same option the next time it was encountered,
depending on when this reward occurred relative to the choice.
Given that subjects were precisely instructed that rewards were
given with a 3 s delay, in a subject relying exclusively on contin-gent learning, only those rewards occurring around 3 s after a
choice should have an impact on reselecting that same stimulus.
If, in contrast, subjects relied on noncontingent learning, then
credit for rewards should spread back to noncausal choices
made in the recent past.
We looked for these effects in five time bins before a reward
(time bins were as follows: bin 1, 0–0.5 s; bin 2, 0.5–1.5 s;
bin 3, 1.5–2.5 s; bin 4, 2.5–3.5 s; bin 5, 3.5–4.5 s). As expected,
the effects of rewards depended on the time bin in which choices
fell (ANOVA, effect of bin, F4,116 = 94.01, p < 0.0001). Consistent
with a robust contingent learning mechanism, choices of stim-
ulus A in time bin 4 (t29 = 14.58, p < 0.0001) markedly increased
the probability of choosing A again in the future (Figure 2A). Sub-
jects were therefore able to assign credit for a reward to itsNeuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authors 179
causal choice despite the fact that there would often be another
choice between the two events.
However, behavior was not exclusively driven by this precise
contingent learning mechanism. Rewards following choices of
A also increased the likelihood of future selections of A, but
only if they occurred immediately after the choice (bin 1, t29 =
3.01, p = 0.0054; bin 2, t29 = 4.41, p = 0.0001), despite the fact
that subjects were aware they were unrelated (Figure 2A). This
involuntary spread of reward effect was specific to early time
bins. While there was still a trend in bin 3 (t29 = 1.75, p =
0.091), rewards in later bin 5 had no effect on behavior (p >
0.77). Furthermore, the averaged effect in bins 1 and 2 was
bigger compared to bin 3 (t29 = 1.76, p = 0.044, one-tailed) and
to bin 5 (t29 > 2.43, p = 0.011, one-tailed). This effect of a reward
not only reinforcing the choice that really led to its delivery but
also other choices that occurred in close temporal proximity,
was first described by Thorndike as early as 1933 (Thorndike,
1933) and has been termed ‘‘spread of effect.’’ Here, we refer
to this spread of effect to proximal choices as PROX.
To examine statistical credit assignment mechanisms, we
first asked whether subjects might misassign credit for a
reward to the wrong choice if that choice had commonly
been taken in the past (Walton et al., 2010), as if the reward
is being credited to the average behavioral policy, and not to
the particular choice that caused it. While contingent rewards
that followed B or C choices made the future selection of A
shapes less likely on average (Figure 2B), this was not true at
times when the subject had selected A often in the recent
past. Indeed, contingent rewards following B or C choices
increased future A choices as an increasing function of the fre-
quency of A choices in the past 30 trials (ANOVA, effect of bin,
F4,116 = 2.45, p = 0.05; t test for bin 4, t29 = 3.14, p = 0.004; Fig-
ure 2C). That is, part of the credit for a reward following B or C
choices was more likely to be misassigned to A the more often
A had been selected in the recent past. We refer to this type of
noncontingent learning as spread of effect to the recent history
of choices (SoECh). Importantly, this cannot be explained by a
mere autocorrelation in subjects’ choices. First, it predicts a
switch away from the current choice of B onto the historical
choice of A. Second, it is specific to rewarded choices. Third,
it is specific to the contingent bin. Lastly, we included separate
nuisance regressors in the regression model (see Experimental
Procedures) to control for the main effect of choice history of A,
the main effect of overall choice history, and the main effect of
overall reward history. While the choice history of A had no ef-
fect (p = 0.3), the overall choice history had an effect, which,
however, was negative and hence cannot explain the increased
propensity to select option A (t22 = 4.1484, p = 0.0003). In
addition, the overall rate of rewards increased subjects’ pro-
pensity to select A (t22 = 5.09, p < 0.00002). Next, we followed
this latter effect up by asking whether subjects may be more
likely to select shapes if the recent average reward rate was
high, even if this was driven by noncontingent rewards that
were unrelated to the subjects’ choices. We performed a sepa-
rate regression that tested how the time-averaged rate of re-
sponding was dependent upon the time-averaged rate of
contingent and noncontingent rewards (Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures, available online). By definition, the rate of180 Neuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authorsresponding depended on contingent rewards (as those are by
design tied to responses). Importantly, however, response
rates were also dependent on the rate of noncontingent re-
wards (t29 = 6.04, p < 0.00001; Figure 2D), indicating that the
average rate of rewards increased the rate of responding.
Thus, in addition to contingent learning, PROX, and SoECh, par-
ticipants’ choices were also guided by a spread of effect to the
recent history of rewards (SoERew).
Notably, despite some relations (maximum r = 0.38), the domi-
nant contingent learning and the three noncontingent learning
mechanisms (PROX, SoECh, and SoERew) were largely uncorre-
lated across subjects (Figure S1 for full correlation matrix), sug-
gesting separable mechanisms. The behavioral effects reported
here are derived from 30 subjects, which include the 23 subjects
that underwent scanning and an additional 7 subjects that took
part in the final version of the behavioral pilot. Note, however,
that we obtain an identical pattern of results when repeating
the same analyses following inclusion of only the 23 fMRI sub-
jects (Figure S2A).
While in experiment 1 we aimed to investigate how multiple
credit assignment strategies vary naturally in the extent they
guide learning, in experiment 2 we selectively manipulated
learning strategies through task instructions. Participants
made choices between two fractal stimuli according to three
types of instructions that changed for each block of trials (Fig-
ures 1, right, and S2B). In each block the probability of each
choice leading to reward was constant (Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures) In DIRECT blocks, outcomes were contin-
gent on the choice in the same trial. To dissociate contingency
from choices made in the same trial with the outcome, in
NBACK blocks, outcomes were delayed by a known number
of trials (one or two). Hence, they were contingent on a previ-
ous, but specific, choice. In FORWARD blocks, rewards were
delayed by a small random number of trials that was not known
to the subject, such that outcomes could no longer be linked
contingently to any specific causal choice. This ensured that
unlike in NBACK blocks, it was not clear on which specific
choices outcomes were contingent. Note that while subjects
cannot learn contingently in the FORWARD condition, learning
is still possible using statistical mechanisms. That is, while they
do not know which one of the preceding four choices (current,
immediately previous, two, or three trials past) caused the
reward observed, they can still assign the credit to the average
choice. Despite these three different types of instructions, the
true contingencies were always structured according to the
FORWARD condition. Thus, across all conditions, rewards
were delayed, or projected forward, by a random number of tri-
als. This simple manipulation controlled for a number of critical
factors across conditions (Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). This setup allowed us to interrogate fMRI signals re-
flecting contingency, as they contain sequences of trials that
are identical between conditions in all respects except for the
instructed contingency between choice and outcome. Thus,
the only difference between conditions was in the instructed
contingencies.
Despite the true contingencies being identical in each condi-
tion, participant behavior was consistent with the three different
instruction sets. Logistic regression (Supplemental Experimental
Figure 3. Contingent Reward Responses and Relation to Contingent Learning in Experiment 1
(A) Whole-brain results for the contrast contingent- noncontingent rewards in experiment 1.
(B) Inspection of the BOLD signal at the peak coordinate in lOFC shows that this region responds selectively to contingent, but not noncontingent, rewards. Solid
lines show the mean and shaded areas the SEM of the regression coefficients across subjects. The black vertical line represents the time of outcome delivery.
Values are mean ± SEM of regression coefficients across subjects
(C) Regression of the contrast in (A) against contingent learning versus PROX + SoECh reveals that contingent reward responses in lOFC correlate with contingent
learning behavior.
(D) Parameter estimates were extracted from the peak coordinate of the contrast in (A) and related to the different learning mechanism. The plots show that lOFC
responses to contingent rewards are negatively related to noncontingent learning via PROX and SoECh. The correlations are partial correlations, that is, after
regressing out the effects of the respective other learning mechanisms from both parameters of interest. See also Figure S5 and Table S1.Procedures) revealed a condition-by-trial interaction (F6,138 =
8.62, p < 0.0001). Breaking these effects down showed that
rewards increased future selections of the current choice in the
DIRECT condition; the n  1 and n  2 choices in the 1BACK
and 2BACK conditions, respectively; and all three previous
choices in the FORWARD condition (Figures 2E and 2F). This
demonstrates that subjects indeed deployed contingent learning
in the DIRECT and NBACK conditions but noncontingent
learning in the FORWARD condition, in which contingencies
were unknown. Subjects were therefore able to exploit contin-
gent learning mechanisms when contingencies were clearly
discernible, but they were able to exploit noncontingent learning
mechanisms when contingencies were unclear. Importantly, we
ensured that the only difference between conditions was the in-
structed contingencies, while keeping all possible other factors
comparable between conditions, such as subjects’ rate of
learning, the number of rewards earned, errors committed, and
response times (Supplemental Experimental Procedures; Fig-
ures S3 and S4).Signals Supporting Contingent Learning in lOFC
To search for brain regions linked to contingent learning, we
examined the BOLD response at the time of the outcome in
the conditions where subjects received instructions about the
precise associations between stimuli and rewards: contingent
and noncontingent rewards in experiment 1; reward and no
reward in the DIRECT and NBACK conditions of experiment 2.
We predicted that the lOFC would underlie precise contingent
learning and, therefore, that subjects with more activity in this
brain region would rely less on noncontingent learning.
We first harnessed the interindividual variability in learning
strategies in experiment 1 and investigated their neural corre-
lates. We contrasted BOLD responses between contingent and
noncontingent rewards. While both serve as rewards, it is only
during the former that a contingency between the reward and
a choice has to be established. As the contingent rewards
were the principal focus of subject attention, it is not surprising
that this contrast revealed a large network of brain regions (Fig-
ure 3A; Table S1; whole-brain cluster corrected at p < 0.001;Neuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authors 181
cluster size threshold, p < 0.05), including the lOFC (MNI xyz =
–24 mm, 35 mm, –12 mm, z max = 5.1 and xyz = 26 mm,
40mm, –10mm, zmax = 4.59) and bilateral striatum, in particular
in the ventromedial caudate nucleus (MNI xyz = –8 mm, 11 mm,
–1 mm, z max = 5.16; and xyz = 10 mm, 14 mm, 1 mm, z max =
4.69; Figure 3A). Visualization of this difference effect in
the lOFC revealed that it was driven exclusively by the positive
(contingent rewards) portion of the contrast, and not the negative
(noncontingent rewards) portion (Figure 3B). From each sub-
ject’s behavior, we computed the ratio of contingent learning
to noncontingent mechanisms. We asked whether the afore-
mentioned BOLD contrast [contingent rewards – noncontingent
rewards] in any voxels would predict the extent to which subjects
relied on precise contingent relative to noncontingent learning
strategies (contingent learning versus PROX + SoECh). Here we
considered the two noncontingent mechanisms that were
contributed to by the contingent rewards (PROX and SoECh), re-
flecting the fact that the BOLD contrast at the first level was
derived from these rewards (PROX can arise by misattribution
of either contingent or noncontingent rewards to proximal
choices; SoECh specifically arises bymisattribution of contingent
rewards to the average choice history. In contrast, SoERew is
specifically defined as the effect of noncontingent rewards).
The only brain region to show a significant effect across subjects
was in the OFC, including the lOFC (p < 0.01, cluster-based
correction at p < 0.05; Figure 3C). Furthermore, extracting
parameter estimates from the peak lOFC coordinate (from the
main contrast contingent minus noncontingent rewards) re-
vealed that lOFC activity was inversely related to both noncontin-
gent learning mechanisms (r = –0.46, p = 0.03 and r = –0.58, p =
0.0034, for PROX and SoECh, respectively; Figure 3D), with no
significant difference (t22 =0.15, p > 0.55). Subjects with strong
lOFC responses to contingent rewards were therefore less likely
to exhibit either form of noncontingent learning relative to accu-
rate contingent learning.
Experiment 2 allowed us to further isolate lOFC’s role in
contingent learning, as it contained sequences of trials identical
in all respects except for contingency. We considered sets of
three trials pertinent to any particular outcome (+ and – denote
reward and nonreward outcomes, respectively): the past trial
(n  1 or n  2), the current trial (n) and the following trial
(n + 1). For example, in the sequence ‘‘BA+B,’’ the subject
switched from a B choice in the previous trial to an A choice in
the current trial, received a reward, and then switched back to
B the following trial. In order to examine contingency, we exam-
ined BOLD activity at the time of this outcome and contrasted tri-
als in which the ‘‘following’’ choice respected the contingencies
of the outcome against those where it did not. For example,
BA+A and BA-B are contingent sequences in DIRECT blocks
because the subject acted in accordance with the outcome
(stay with rewarded A or switch back from unrewarded A). By
contrast, in NBACK blocks, these same sequences are noncon-
tingent because the outcome pertained to the preceding B,
rather than the proximal A. Similarly, [BA-A, BA+B] are noncon-
tingent sequences in DIRECT blocks but contingent sequences
in NBACK blocks. To control for block differences, [AA+A,
AA-B] are contingent and [AA-A, AA+B] noncontingent in all con-
ditions. It is notable that comparisons between contingent and182 Neuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authorsnoncontingent sequences are controlled both within and across
conditions for choices, outcomes, and switches but, on average,
distinguish outcomes that caused contingent learning from
those that did not.
We extracted data from an ROI in the lOFC selected from an
orthogonal contrast (see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures for ROI selection). In line with a contingency-related
response, BA+A caused greater lOFC activity than BA-A in
DIRECT, but not NBACK, blocks (Figure 4A; difference, t23 =
3.28, p = 0.002), and BA+B caused greater lOFC activity than
BA-B in NBACK, but not DIRECT, blocks (Figure 4B; difference,
t23 = 3.03, p = 0.003). Combining these two effects according to
DIRECT contingencies revealed a positive effect in DIRECT
blocks (t23 = 2.45, p = 0.01) and a negative effect in NBACK
blocks (t23 = 2.72, p = 0.006), where contingencies were
reversed (Figure 4C). Notably, repeating this analysis for se-
quences that began AA, where contingencies were identical
across blocks (Figure 4D), revealed a positive response in both
conditions (DIRECT, t23 = 2.56, p = 0.009; NBACK, t23 = 2.74,
p = 0.006; difference not shown). Hence, across all tests, lOFC
responses were aligned with contingencies rather than rewards
or behavior (Figure 4E; t23 = 3.77, p = 0.0005; Figure 4F; t23 =
3.65,p = 0.0007). This is particularly notable in light of previous
theories of lOFC function that have argued for error processing
(Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Fellows, 2007) or behavioral
switching (Jones and Mishkin, 1972; Dias et al., 1997; Chuda-
sama and Robbins, 2003) to be cardinal functions of the region.
Further to the effects in the lOFC, it is noteworthy that at the
whole-brain level, contrasting contingent with noncontingent tri-
als revealed a network of brain regions very similar to that found
in experiment 1 when contrasting contingent with noncontingent
rewards (Figure S6). In particular, these included lOFC (MNI
xyz = –24 mm, 40 mm, –16 mm, z max = 3.8), bilateral ventral
striatum (MNI xyz = ±16 mm, 10 mm, –14 mm, z max = 4.1),
and lateral prefrontal cortex (MNI xyz = 42 mm, 32 mm,
22 mm, z max = 4.1).
Amygdala Responses Mediate Noncontingent Learning
Across experiments, neural signals were therefore consistent
with contingent learning mechanisms in a network of fronto-
striatal brain regions, with the strongest behavioral impact in
the lOFC. However, in experiment 1, subjects also deployed
three noncontingent learning strategies, PROX, SoECh, and
SoERew. On the basis of previous lesion data from both ma-
caques and rodents (Stalnaker et al., 2007; Rudebeck and Mur-
ray, 2008), we hypothesized that the amygdala might play a key
role for at least some of these noncontingent mechanisms.
Amygdala lesions facilitate reversal learning in monkeys (Ru-
debeck and Murray, 2008) and restore the ability to perform re-
versals after OFC lesions in rodents (Stalnaker et al., 2007). Since
OFC reversal deficits are reflective of deficits in precise contin-
gent learning (Walton et al., 2010), it is conceivable that amyg-
dala activity at the time of a reward might downweight precise
associations in favor of statistical ones. In our experiment 1,
such an argument makes two predictions. First, it predicts that
amygdala activity at the time of contingent rewards would lead
to less contingent and greater statistical learning (which is mal-
adaptive in the current task). Second, it predicts that amygdala
Figure 4. Analysis TestingWhether the OFC Signal in Experiment 2 Fulfils the Criteria of a Signal Encoding Associations between Outcomes
and Their Causal Choices
Each panel shows the observed temporal evolution of aGLM contrast over intratrial time (contrast parameter estimates ± SEM). Data are averaged across all OFC
voxels that survived the (orthogonal) contingency contrast on AA? triplets. Outcomes (reward/nonreward) refer to the outcome of the middle trial in each triplet.
Vertical bars separate decision, delay, outcome, and interval phases.
(A) Consistent with a signal encoding contingent associations between choices and outcomes, only in the outcome phase of DIRECT trials do contingent as-
sociations elicit an increased lOFC signal.
(B) In NBACK blocks, it is the noncontingent trials that yield lOFC activity.
(C) Taken together, contingent and noncontingent trials lead to exactly opposite signals in DIRECT and NBACK blocks (addition of the contrasts [BA+B - BAB] +
[BAB - BA+B]).
(D) In AA? triplets, contingent choices are identical in DIRECT and NBACK blocks; accordingly, lOFC shows the same effect in both conditions (contrasting
[BA+B - BAB] - [BAB - BA+B] triplets).
(E) BA? triplets show a highly significant contingency effect in the lOFC.
(F) Thus, AA? triplets show an equally strong contingency effect as BA? triplets. Overall, the figure shows that lOFC activity is incompatible with predictions made
by the reward and reward prediction error hypotheses but corresponds precisely to the predictions made by the contingency hypothesis. Note that all plots were
produced by right-aligning data from the decision phases so as to line up with the decisions themselves. The jittered duration of the delay phase thus causes a
discontinuity between the delay and the monitor phases in this visualization. See also Figure S6.activity at the time of free rewards would mean these free re-
wards were less likely to be treated as contingent rewards (which
is adaptive in the current task).
To address this second prediction, we searched for brain re-
gions whose responses to noncontingent rewards were related
to noncontingent learning. Consistent with the mechanism
described above, we found clusters bilaterally in the amygdala
and anterior hippocampus that exhibited a negative correlation
with noncontingent learning (MNI xyz = –19 mm, –3 mm,
–21 mm, z max = 4.06 and xyz = 24 mm, –9 mm, –18 mm,
z max = 4.25; whole-brain cluster corrected at p < 0.01; cluster
size threshold, p < 0.05; Figure 5A). Subjects with large re-
sponses to free rewards in these regions were thus unlikely to
inaccurately treat these free rewards as contingent. Extracting
parameter estimates from the peak coordinate revealed that
subjects with strong amygdala responses to noncontingent re-
wards relied less on all three noncontingent learning mecha-
nisms (r = –0.67, –0.71, and –0.81 for PROX, SoECh, and SoERew,respectively; all p < 0.0006; Figure 5B). Notably, while the amyg-
dala response correlated equally strongly with PROX and SoECh
(t22 = 0.81, p > 0.4), it correlated more strongly with SoERew
compared to both SoECh and PROX (t22 = 4.72 and t22 = 4.41,
p < 0.0003). Moreover, in contrast to the lOFC, contingent re-
wards had no significant effect in the amygdala and did not pre-
dict any marker of learning (all t < 0.73, p > 0.47).
We extracted data from the peak amygdala coordinate from
this cluster to test our first prediction. Amygdala activity should
be suppressed to allow contingent learning from contingent re-
wards. We first note that when taken on average over the group,
amygdala activity is indeed suppressed after subjects make a
response in anticipation of a contingent reward (Figure 5C;
t22 = –3.75, p = 0.001). Furthermore, across subjects, this sup-
pression is negatively related to the two statistical learning
mechanisms (t22 = 2.7 and t22 = 3.06, p = 0.013 and p = 0.006;
SoECh and SoERew, respectively). Subjects who do not exhibit
this suppression will learn statistically, not contingently, fromNeuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authors 183
Figure 5. Amygdala and Noncontingent Learning
(A) In experiment 1, stronger amygdala responses to noncontingent rewards correlate with better contingent relative to noncontingent learning.
(B) Extraction of parameter estimates from the peak coordinate of the above contrast in (A) shows that amygdala responses to noncontingent rewards in
experiment 1 correlate negatively with all three noncontingent learningmechanisms, albeit the correlation with SoERewwasmore pronounced than that with either
SoECh or PROX (see main text). The correlations are partial correlations, that is, after regressing out the effects of the respective other learning mechanisms from
both parameters of interest.
(C) Following a choice, the amygdala signal was suppressed (left). Amygdala activity after a choice (in anticipation of a contingent reward) correlated positively
with SoECh and SoERew (right), meaning that a lack of amygdala suppression was associated with misassignment of the following reward via one of these
noncontingent mechanisms.
(D) On a trial-by-trial level, credit for a reward following choice of A was likely to bemisassigned to one of the noncontingent bins when amygdala activity was high
in the period between choice and reward.
(E) In experiment 2, amygdala was exclusively reward sensitive in the FORWARD condition, the only condition where learning was only possible from spreading
credit for a reward to the average choice history. The graph shows the evolution of a simple ‘‘reward-no reward’’ contrast over intratrial time as in Figure 4, taken
from the peak coordinate from experiment 1 shown in (A).
Solid lines in (C) and (E) show themean; shaded areas and error bars in (D) represent the SEM of the contrast estimates across subjects. The black vertical lines in
(E) represent the time of choice and outcome delivery, respectivelythe contingent rewards. Despite the absence of an effect on
PROX, the effect survives the averaging over all three noncontin-
gent mechanisms (t22 = 3.68, p = 0.0013).
In order to strengthen this argument within subjects, we de-
signed a novel analysis strategy that examined the relationship
between this amygdala suppression and noncontingent learning
on a choice-by-choice basis within a single subject. We fit sepa-
rate hemodynamic response functions to the amygdala activity
after every button press. This resulted in a vector of parameters
describing the amygdala response to each button press. We
then performed a new behavioral regression like the regression
in Figures 2A–2C, but now each behavioral regressor was paired
with a second regressor: the interaction of itself and the
(demeaned) amygdala response. This regression therefore
asks whether the amygdala responses predict how the reward
will impact future behavior. Despite the noisy nature of single-
trial fMRI fits, a pattern emerged in which increased amygdala
activity before rewards (the absence of amygdala suppression)
led to noncontingent learning. If amygdala activity was high
following choice of A, then rewards in the noncontingent bins
made future choices of A more likely (Figure 5D; average over
all bins, t22 = 2.58, p = 0.017).
Together, these results suggest that amygdala responses in
the anticipation and delivery of reward lead to a reduction of pre-184 Neuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authorscise contingent learning from that reward. More activity to free
rewards makes it less likely that those rewards will be falsely
treated as contingent. Activity is suppressed in anticipation of
contingent rewards. The absence of this suppression makes it
more likely that contingent rewards will be treated statistically
(rather than contingently) and more likely that intervening free re-
wards will be mistaken for contingent ones. We investigated
this effect further by examining amygdala reward responses in
experiment 2, which included an explicit experimental manipula-
tion to control contingent learning. We extracted signal from the
above peak coordinate identified in experiment 1 (MNI xyz =
–19 mm, –3 mm, –21 mm) and compared responses in the
DIRECT and NBACK conditions, where rewards could be attrib-
uted to particular choices in the past, to those in the FORWARD
condition, where rewards could not be assigned to any particular
choice but nevertheless reinforced current broad behavioral pol-
icies (statistical learning). While activity in the amygdala did not
distinguish rewards from unrewarding outcomes in either of the
two contingent conditions (t23 = 1.68 and 0.95, p > 0.1 and p >
0.34; DIRECT and NBACK, respectively), it exhibited a clear
reward effect in the noncontingent FORWARD condition (Fig-
ure 5E; t23 = 3.46, p < 0.003; difference between FORWARD
and DIRECT, t23 = 2.35, p = 0.014, one-tailed; difference be-
tween FORWARD and NBACK, t23 = 1.84, p = 0.04, one-tailed).
Figure 6. Connectivity of lOFC with VMS
(A) VMS connectivity with lOFC during contingent
versus free rewards is related to better contingent
relative to noncontingent learning.
(B) Increased VMS-lOFC connectivity during
contingent rewards is related to decreased
SoErew, whereas the opposite pattern is found for
connectivity during free rewards. Correlations are
partial correlations, that is, after regressing out the
effects of the respective other learning mecha-
nisms from both parameters of interest.lOFC Interactions with Ventral Striatum
In our main contrast of contingent versus free rewards, we
found, in addition to the effect in lOFC, a prominent effect in
ventromedial striatum (VMS). While this effect, unlike the lOFC
effect, did not correlate with behavior across subjects, it is plau-
sible that interactions between lOFC and VMS underlie precise
contingent learning. VMS receives dense projections from lOFC
(Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1985), and, together, the two
structures are part of a key circuit underlying goal-directed
learning (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). We therefore performed a
psychophysiological interaction analysis (PPI, see Supple-
mental Experimental Proceduresfor details) to test whether
increased coupling between lOFC and VMS during contingent
versus free rewards supports contingent learning. We extracted
data from the peak coordinate in the VMS (MNI xyz = –8 mm,
11 mm, –1 mm and xyz = 10 mm, 14 mm, 1 mm) and searched
for regions in which coupling with this seed region was related
to individual differences in learning styles. In line with our hy-
pothesis, we found regions in bilateral lOFC in which higher
coupling with VMS during contingent versus free rewards was
related to better contingent relative to noncontingent learning
(uncorrected at p < 0.001, MNI xyz = –24 mm, 36 mm,
–11 mm, z max = 3.17 and xyz = 22 mm, 36 mm, –19 mm, z
max = 3.58; Figure 6A). We extracted parameter estimates
from this coordinate to test whether this effect could be specif-
ically related to connectivity during receipt of contingent or free
rewards. We found that connectivity during contingent rewards
was associated with diminished SoERew (r = –0.47, p = 0.029),
whereas free reward connectivity was related to increased
SoERew (r = 0.5, p = 0.016; Figure 6B). The other learning param-
eters, while generally showing a similar pattern, did not reach
significance.Neuron 90, 177–Midbrain and Dorsolateral Striatal
Reward Responses Promote
Noncontingent Learning
In experiment 1, we found that credit for a
contingent reward was not only assigned
correctly to the causal choice but also
incorrectly to temporally proximal choices
(PROX; Figure 2A) and to the average his-
tory of recent choices (SoECh; Figure 2C).
Using the same contrast [contingent re-
wardsnoncontingent rewards] asabove
for lOFC,we founda regionof themidbrain
showing the opposite relation to behavioras lOFC. In this midbrain region, consistent with the location of
dopaminergic cell groups of the ventral tegmental area (VTA)
and pars compacta of the substantia nigra (SNC), responses to
contingent rewardscorrelated negativelywith thedegree towhich
subjects deployed precise contingent learning as opposed to
both PROX and SoECh (MNI xyz = –5 mm, –16 mm, –19 mm, z
max = –3.66 and xyz = 6 mm, –15 mm, –21 mm, z max = 3.48;
p < 0.001, uncorrected; Figure 7A). Please note that this contrast
did not survive cluster-based thresholding, which, however, is un-
surprising given the small size expected of midbrain clusters. We
extracted parameter estimates from the peak location of this cor-
relation to test if this effect could be specifically related to PROX,
or if it was more generally related to overall noncontingent
learning. At this peak location, responses were strongly related
to PROX (r = 0.66, p < 0.001; Figure 7A) and to SoECh (r = 0.52,
p=0.01), but not toSoERew (r = 0.23, p= 0.28). Furthermore, direct
comparison revealed that midbrain activity was, by trend, more
strongly related to PROX than to SoECh (t22 = 1.65, p = 0.0566).
These results suggest that VTA/SNC responses to contingent re-
wards may lead to part of the credit for these rewards being mis-
assigned to both proximal choices and to the average choice
history.
We reasoned that PROXmight arise because the close tempo-
ral coincidence of the reward-evoked dopamine release with a
motor command in regions such as dorsolateral striatum would
‘‘stamp in’’ such stimulus-response associations (Redgrave and
Gurney, 2006; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). Following this logic, the
magnitude of reward responses in sensorimotor striatal regions
will depend on the delay between choice of a stimulus and the
outcome, with sooner rewards being more effective. We investi-
gated this by setting up a parametric contrast in which all re-
wards were modulated by the time elapsed since the last action.190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authors 185
Figure 7. Relationship of Midbrain and Dorsal Striatal Reward Responses to Noncontingent Learning in Experiment 1
(A) Midbrain responses to contingent rewards in a region consistent with the location of substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area correlate negatively with the
degree to which subjects’ behavior was guided by contingent learning as opposed to either PROX or SoECh—the exact opposite pattern of what was observed in
lOFC (see Figures 3C and 3D). Contingent reward responses at the peak location were strongly related to both PROX and SoECh; however, the correlation with
PROX tended to be stronger than that with SoECh.
(B) A parametric contrast revealed that rewards elicited a stronger response the sooner they occurred following a choice (upper row). In areas associated with
model-free learning such as putamen and associated motor cortical areas, this effect was strongly related to the extent subjects’ behavior was guided by PROX
(bottom row).We found that rewards delivered soon after a choice evoked re-
sponses in the putamen, the rostral caudate, and the bilateral
premotor cortex (p < 0.01, cluster corrected at p < 0.05; Fig-
ure 7B, upper row). This network, unlike the circuitry involving
lOFC and ventral striatum responsive to contingent rewards,
has been implicated in learning of stimulus-response habits in
a habitual fashion (Yin and Knowlton, 2006). Importantly, we
found that this effect in bilateral putamen (MNI xyz = –30, –3,
10, z max = 4.09 and xyz = 29, –7, 5, z max = 3.43) and bilateral
motor cortex (MNI xyz = –29, –21, 45, z max = 3.9 and xyz = 35,
–14, 53, z max = 4.43) was stronger in subjects who relied more
on PROX (p < 0.01, cluster corrected at p < 0.05; Figure 7B, bot-
tom row). To test whether these timing-dependent reward ef-
fects were specifically related to PROX or to both PROX and
SoECh, we extracted parameter estimates from independent
peak coordinates in the putamen andmotor cortex to test for dif-
ferential correlation. The peak was selected from a contrast of
the correlation with both PROX and SoECh, thus avoiding bias to-
ward either of the two mechanisms. In both putamen and motor
cortex, the response was strongly related to both PROX (t22 =
5.04 and t22 = 5.32, p < 0.00005) and SoECh (t22 = 2.82 and
t22 = 2.65, p < 0.015), but not SoERew (p > 0.2). Direct contrasts
further revealed a significantly stronger correlation with PROX
compared to SoECh in both areas (t22 = 2.59 and t22 = 2.9, p <
0.02). Thus, reward modulated activity in both putamen and mo-
tor cortex depending on the timing relative to a choice, and this
modulation was related to noncontingent learning in both struc-
tures. While proximity-based reward responses correlated with
both PROX and SoECh, they did not correlate with SoERew, and186 Neuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The Authorsthe correlation with PROX was more pronounced than that
with SoECh. This provides further evidence that PROX and SoECh
are not only dissociable behaviorally but also neurally. It is also
important to note that this pattern is different to that found in
the lOFC, where responses to contingent rewards were nega-
tively related to both PROX and SoECh to the same extent.
Thus, while contingent reward responses in lOFC appear to
generally suppress noncontingent learning from contingent re-
wards, proximity-dependent reward responses in putamen and
motor cortex appear to be predominantly associated with
PROX, i.e., with spreading credit for a reward to very recent
choices.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that in a dynamic environment, the choices of
healthy participants are guided by both precise contingent
and noncontingent learning mechanisms that are separable
both behaviorally and at the neural level. Behavior was
dominated by learning that reflected the true choice-outcome
contingencies. Such learning appeared to rely in part on
lOFC. However, we were also able to identify other learning
mechanisms that assigned outcomes to incorrect choices.
Two of them were statistical learning mechanisms that learned
through time-averaged choices and rewards. These behaviors
appeared to rely in part on amygdala responses both in anticipa-
tion and receipt of rewards. Lastly, we identified a ‘‘heuristic’’
learning mechanism whereby rewards were inaccurately paired
with choices that immediately preceded them. This direct
action-outcome pairing was predicted by responses in themotor
corticostriatal circuitry.
In healthy macaques, precise contingent learning is usually so
powerful that it dwarves the influence of other learning mecha-
nisms. The contribution of these noncontingent mechanisms
only becomes evident after lesions to lOFC (Walton et al.,
2010). Likewise, for healthy human volunteers, credit assignment
is trivial on standard reinforcement learning tasks, where there is
usually only one choice and one outcome per trial. By breaking
with the typical trial-based structure and by randomly delivering
noncontingent rewards, we were able to create a scenario that is
more akin to a naturalistic environment, where several responses
could be candidate actions for a given outcome. This allowed
noncontingent learning mechanisms to become more pro-
nounced and, thus, to be isolated along the dominant contingent
learning mechanism. It is likely that in real-life situations with
many candidate actions and intervening outcomes, the effect
of these noncontingent mechanisms is even more pronounced.
We identified three such noncontingent mechanisms. First, re-
wards that occurred very close in time to a particular action
tended to reinforce that action whether or not it caused the
reward (PROX). This heuristic mechanism is reminiscent of the
steeply diminishing effect of reinforcement with increasing delay
between conditioned stimulus or instrumental action and rein-
forcement (Kamin, 1961; Dickinson et al., 1992). It also bears a
resemblance to the emergence of superstitious behaviors during
operant conditioning, where behaviors unrelated to reward are
often reinforced due to their temporal proximity to reward deliv-
ery (Skinner, 1948; Devenport, 1979). Second, subjects were
likely to assign credit for a reward to a choice that was frequently
selected in the recent past, whether or not it was causally related
to the reward (SoECh). Third, subjects were likely to make
choices more frequently during periods when they were re-
warded frequently, even if those choices did not cause the
reward (SoERew). While such statistical mechanisms can be
catastrophic when contingencies change abruptly from one trial
to the next, they do not impede learning in situations where con-
tingencies are stable or smoothly varying (Walton et al., 2010).
Indeed, related strategies based on average recent reward rates
may be beneficial in foraging-style decisions, which learn only
the relative value of pursuing or switching from a current ongoing
strategy (Charnov, 1976). There are also many real-world exam-
ples where learning via PROX or SoEChmay be adaptive. Contin-
gent learning may be led astray when assumptions about the
causal structure of the task are inaccurate, as is the case in the
confirmation bias (Doll et al., 2011). In situations such as motor
learning, PROX is adaptive because causality is closely tied to
temporal proximity. Likewise, statistical learning mechanisms
that average long-term rewards and choices are adaptive
in situations where it is unclear which precise outcomes relate
to which precise choices.
The noncontingent learning mechanisms we investigate in this
study do not reflect the loss of all credit assignment between
stimulus and reward. Rather, credit assignment in these mecha-
nisms happens either statistically (because stimuli have often
been chosen during rewarding periods) or heuristically (because
a reward happened to occur immediately after a stimulus was
chosen). Indeed, what is unique about the precise contingentmechanism is that the credit for an individual reward is attributed
to a precise individual selection of the relevant stimulus in an
appropriate fashion, reflecting the (accurate) knowledge that
the choice caused the reward to occur. This knowledge may
be gained through instructions, as in the current report, or
through extensive experience on the learning problem, as in
the original report of lesions to macaque OFC (Walton et al.,
2010). The factors that determine the relative contribution of pre-
cise contingent learning and noncontingent mechanisms are, to
our knowledge, not known. It is possible that uncertainty about
the causal structure of the world is one factor that promotes sta-
tistical learning.
The contingent and noncontingent learning mechanisms we
identified were anatomically separable. While a large network
of brain regions was more active during receipt of contingent
as opposed to noncontingent rewards in experiment 1 (likely re-
flecting an attentional effect), lOFC was the only one of these
areas to show a clear relationship to contingent learning. Sub-
jects with the strongest responses to contingent rewards in
this region were least likely to misassign these rewards via either
PROX or SoECh. Similarly, connectivity between lOFC and VMS
during receipt of contingent rewards was related to better
contingent learning. Furthermore, experiment 2 allowed us to
dissect the OFC reward signal in precise detail. By comparing
triplets of trials that were identical in all respects except for the
instructed contingencies, we could show that the same reward
in a given triplet had opposite effects depending on whether
the reward had to be associated with the choice on the current
trial or with the alternative choice on the previous trial. Thus,
our results are consistent with lOFC encoding the exact kind of
signal required to solve the credit assignment problem, that is,
to associate a reward with the choice that caused it (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). These data are in agreement with studies
showing that OFC neurons flexibly encode the reward-predictive
properties of stimuli (Thorpe et al., 1983; Schoenbaum et al.,
1998; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2008; Morrison and Salzman, 2009). Accordingly, lesions to the
OFC reliably produce deficits in adjusting behavior to changes
in stimulus-outcome associations (Mishkin, 1964; Jones and
Mishkin, 1972; Dias et al., 1996; Izquierdo et al., 2004). These
deficits resulted from credit being distributed inappropriately to
choices that were made proximal in time to the outcome and
to the average choice history (Walton et al., 2010). This strongly
suggests that OFC is essential for contingent learning. Our
data support this view: (1) BOLD signals in lOFC displayed
the hallmarks of a signal encoding contingent associations be-
tween outcomes and the choices that caused them, and (2)
lOFC responses to contingent rewards were related to learning
strategies.
The ability to learn causally in reinforcement learning is reliant
on correct knowledge of the state space, or causal structure, of
the learning problem. Indeed, the four learning mechanisms we
have described here might be interpreted mathematically as
different instantiations of the task state space—only one of
them correct—and there are clearly other possible instantiations.
In our case, this state space defines which stimuli might lead to
which outcomes. Closely related theories of OFC function posit
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knowledge of this state space (Takahashi et al., 2011; Wilson
et al., 2014). Critically, knowledge of the state space is orthog-
onal to another common distinction in learning theory, the divi-
sion between model-based and model-free learning (Daw
et al., 2005, 2011; Dayan and Daw, 2008; Dayan and Niv,
2008). Both model-based and model-free learning require a cor-
rect knowledge of the state space and correct contingent updat-
ing (Wilson et al., 2014). In our experiments, subjects were
explicitly informed about the causal structure of the task (even
though this information was misleading in experiment 2). Thus,
our results speak to the lOFC’s role in leveraging this knowledge
of the state space, but not to the issue of how or where in the
brain this structure might be learned or inferred from experience.
Furthermore, while our task was an instrumental learning task,
the role of lOFC in this task likely is in representing stimulus-
outcome associations (Schoenbaum et al., 2009), rather than ac-
tion-outcome associations, which instead appear to relymore on
anterior cingulate cortex (Kennerley et al., 2006; Rudebeck et al.,
2008; Luk and Wallis, 2013).
We found a parallel but contrasting role for amygdala re-
sponses in learning. Suppression of the amygdala occurred
before contingent rewards. The absence of this suppression al-
lowed false learning from free rewards and statistical learning to
take place. Counterintuitively, however, subjects with strongest
amygdala responses to the free rewards were least likely to learn
falsely or statistically from these rewards, perhaps because
learning from these rewards also required amygdala suppres-
sion. Critically, in experiment 2, we had an entire condition where
learning was only possible using statistical learning by spreading
credit to the average choice. We found that amygdala became
exclusively reward responsive in this condition, but not in the
conditions where outcomes could be linked to a particular caus-
ative choice. The requirement for amygdala suppression to pre-
vent statistical learning may go someway toward explaining why
amygdala lesions during reversal learning lead to faster acquisi-
tion of the reversals (Rudebeck and Murray, 2008) and why
reversal learning deficits following OFC lesions are abolished
after subsequent lesions to the basolateral amygdala (Stalnaker
et al., 2007).
Hence, activity in lOFC and amygdala was important for
correctly assigning credit for contingent rewards and preventing
the misassignment of noncontingent rewards. Such activity
might be important as there are other brain systems where
learning occurs in simpler fashions, not respecting the true
causal structure of the reward environment. We found clear ex-
amples of such learning in the putamen and associated motor
cortex. Here, rewards evoked stronger responses the sooner
they were delivered following a choice, and subjects that ex-
hibited this pattern of activity most strongly were most likely to
exhibit noncontingent learning patterns, particularly by learning
via proximal choices. Furthermore, we found that responses to
contingent rewards in amidbrain region consistent with the loca-
tion of dopaminergic cell bodies were negatively related to
contingent learning. Specifically, midbrain responses to contin-
gent reward were associated with a misattribution of these re-
wards to both proximal choices (PROX) and the average choice
history (SoECh), the exact opposite relationship to that observed
in lOFC.188 Neuron 90, 177–190, April 6, 2016 ª2016 The AuthorsA number of neuronal mechanisms have been suggested to
underlie credit assignment via contingent and noncontingent
learning. Neurons in OFC carry representations of outcome iden-
tity over delay periods (Lara et al., 2009), and they encode the
choice made by an animal at the time of outcome delivery (Tsu-
jimoto et al., 2009). This might be a mechanism to link outcomes
to their causal choices. Alternatively, neurons in primate dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) carry representations of both
the current choice and previous choices (Seo et al., 2007). This
might be used by reinforcement learning mechanisms in the
basal ganglia to bridge temporal gaps when outcomes are de-
layed. Noncontingent learning mechanisms likely recruit
different mechanisms, of which those underlying PROX are argu-
ably best understood. It has been shown that a dopamine burst
will only promote spike-timing-dependent plasticity at striatal
dendritic spines if that burst occurs within a narrow time window
of 0.3–2 s after the sensorimotor input (Yagishita et al., 2014),
which is remarkably consistent with the time window during
which PROX occurred in our data. Learning via such eligibility
traces (Sutton and Barto, 1998) might also be leveraged for
learning using SoECh when the broad history of choices is rein-
forced, rather than a single action (Bogacz et al., 2007). Again,
coding of past choices by dlPFC neurons might play a role in
such eligibility traces spanning multiple actions.
Taken together, we have shown that in a complex environ-
ment, behavior is guided by separable contingent and noncon-
tingent learning mechanisms that compete for control over
behavior. The lOFC takes a key position in guiding the balance
between these mechanisms. It supports contingent learning by
encoding contingent associations between outcomes and their
causal choices and suppresses the contribution of noncontin-
gent mechanisms. Amygdala activity following a choice plays a
role in noncontingent learning via statistical mechanisms,
whereas noncontingent learning via heuristic mechanisms is
related to reward responses in motor corticostriatal circuitry
and regions of the dopaminergic midbrain.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Ethical approval for methods and procedures was obtained from the Central
University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Oxford.
Behavioral Analyses Experiment 1
In order to estimate the contribution of different learning mechanisms to
behavior, we used a multiple logistic regression that tested the impact of
past rewards on future selections of an option, depending on when these re-
wards occurred relative to choice. We set up the following model:
Y= b0X0 + baXa + bbXb +bcXc +h;
where Y is the dependent outcome ‘‘choice of current option’’ (0/1); X0 is a
constant term; and Xa, Xb, and Xc represent threematrices that each contained
40 regressors (8 3 5) coding for eight past rewards, each split into five bins.
Each regressor represented choice of an option in the corresponding time
bin (0–0.5, 0.5–1.5, 1.5–2.5, 2.5–3.5, and 3.5–4.5 s prior to reward onset. Matrix
Xa represented choices of the ‘‘same’’ option A, whereas Xb represented
choices of ‘‘different’’ options B or C. The shape on the current trial was always
designated as A, whereas the other shapes were labeled B and C. Matrix Xc
was identical to Xb but was interacted with the frequency of previous choices
of option A during the past 30 shape presentations. This allowed us to assess
how credit for a reward following one choice, B or C, wasmore likely to bemis-
assigned to A as a function of how often A had been selected in the past. The
nuisance term h represents three further regressors coding for the frequency
of previous A choices, the number of overall choices, and the overall number of
rewards observed during the past 30 symbol presentations. These nuisance
regressors therefore controlled for simple autocorrelation in choice (1) specific
to the particular option and (2) generally regardless of what choice was made
and additionally for the effects of the number of rewards earned in the recent
past. For subsequent analyses (Figures 2A–2C), we summed the resulting
regression coefficients over the eight past rewards for each of the five
time bins in Xa, Xb, and Xc.
A separate logistic regression was performed to estimate the effect of the
average rate of noncontingent rewards on the average rate of res-
ponding, termed SoERew in the manuscript (Supplemental Experimental
Procedures).Acquisition and Analysis of fMRI Data
MRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens Verio (experiment 1) and on a 3T
Siemens Trio (experiment 2, Siemens Germany) system equipped with a
32-channel phased-array head coil as described in detail previously (Jocham
et al., 2012). A total of 514 (experiment 1) or 933 (experiment 2) volumes was
acquired on average, depending on subjects’ reaction times, thus resulting in
total task durations of about 26 and 44min, respectively. We used Presentation
(Neurobehavioral Systems) to present the task and record subjects’ behavior.
Analysisof fMRIdatawasperformedusing tools from theFunctionalMagnetic
Resonance Imaging of the Brain (FMRIB) Software Library (FSL; Smith et al.,
2004). Functional data were motion corrected using rigid-body registration to
the central volume (Jenkinson et al., 2002), corrected for geometric distortions
using the field maps and an n-dimensional phase-unwrapping algorithm
(Jenkinson, 2003), and high-pass filtered using a Gaussian-weighted lines
filter (1/100 Hz and 1/50 Hz for experiments 1 and 2), and spatial smoothing
was applied using a Gaussian filter with 6 (experiment 1) and 5 (experiment 2)
mm full width at half maximum. EPI images were registered with the high-reso-
lution brain images and normalized into standard (MNI) space using affine regis-
tration (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001). A general linear model was fitted into
prewhitened data space to account for local autocorrelations (Woolrich et al.,
2001).
For experiment 1, we set up a single GLM that contained two regressors that
coded for the onsets of contingent and noncontingent rewards, respectively.
Another regressor contained the onsets of all rewards, but with the time
elapsed since last action as a parametric modulator. The duration was
modeled with 0.4 s, corresponding to the actual reward display. Two further
regressors were included to model the main effect of stimulus presentation
(duration 1.5 s) and response (modeled as stick function). In addition, the six
motion parameters from the motion correction were included in the model to
account for residual head motion. For experiment 2, we constructed a GLM
that contained eight separate regressors that accounted for the four triplets
of interest (AAA, AAB, BAB, and BAA), split up by the outcome (reward or non-
reward) on the second trial, each aligned to the outcome of the triplet’s second
trial. Contrast images from the first level were then taken to the group level
using a random effects analysis. Results are reported at p < 0.01, cluster-
based correction for multiple comparisons using a cluster-extent threshold
of p < 0.05, unless stated otherwise.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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